




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# **Mozambique: Machel's Embattled Regime**

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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*ALA 82-10058  
April 1982*

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# **Mozambique: Machel's Embattled Regime**

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## **An Intelligence Assessment**

*Information available as of 19 February 1982  
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

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This paper was prepared by [ ] Office of  
African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and  
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the  
Chief, Southern Africa Division, ALA, [ ]

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This paper has been coordinated with the Directorate of  
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**Mozambique:  
Machel's Embattled Regime**

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**Key Judgments**

The uphill battle waged by President Samora Moises Machel against the insurgency of the South African-backed National Resistance Movement (NRM) is aggravating a host of longstanding domestic problems that could well lead to major changes in the regime during the next year or two. Pro-Soviet hardliners will probably gain greater power. Machel could even be replaced by them or—over the longer term—by the NRM itself.

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Machel's position is secure at the moment, but continued NRM successes are causing heightened frictions at the top levels of the government.

a split has developed between black officials—including Machel—who want to avoid moving Mozambique any closer to the USSR and its allies, and mulatto and white cabinet ministers who advocate an increased Soviet and Cuban military role.

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The insurgency also is demoralizing the Mozambican military. Despite repeated counterinsurgency campaigns, the armed forces have failed to prevent the guerrillas from expanding their area of operations and attacking increasingly important targets. Key among these targets are Mozambican transport and communication links.

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The NRM's actions are having a damaging effect on an already weak economy. The country continues to suffer from the departure in 1975 of most Portuguese technicians and the costs of backing Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the Rhodesian civil war during the late 1970s. The NRM is now targeting European aid technicians in attempts to disrupt Mozambique's slow movement toward expanding aid and trade links with the West.

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The intentions of South Africa, the NRM's primary patron, are crucial to Machel's survival. In recent months, some South African military officials have advocated using the NRM to topple Machel's regime. Pretoria, however, has thus far appeared hesitant to do so, in part because it cannot fully count on the NRM to form a pro-South African government.

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Despite this reluctance to commit itself to Machel's ouster, Pretoria is apparently planning to increase its aid to the NRM. This in turn will probably lead Mozambique to call for greater Communist military assistance. If Machel hesitates too long in doing so, he is likely to be removed by Moscow-oriented military or civilian officials.

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As Moscow's military aid becomes essential for the Mozambican regime to stay in power, so too will Soviet leverage increase. This could result in:

- Soviet access rights to naval or air facilities in Mozambique.
- An expansion of Soviet aid to the ANC in Mozambique, and a possible increase in the frequency and sophistication of ANC operations against South Africa.
- A less cooperative attitude by the Mozambican Government toward negotiations on Namibia, and a more intransigent South African stance.
- A reduction or breakdown of aid and trade links recently established between Mozambique and Western Europe.
- A decline in the West's role in southern Africa as a result of Moscow's enhanced leverage over one of the region's major transport systems.

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
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**Figure 1**  
**Area of Insurgent Operations**



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## Mozambique: Machel's Embattled Regime

### Introduction

The insurgency being waged by the South African-backed National Resistance Movement (NRM) is eroding the unity that had prevailed within the Mozambican Government and the official political party, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), since independence from Portugal in 1975. The regime until recently had been united and stable despite the differing ideologies and racial backgrounds of top officials, the disruptive effects of the departure of most Portuguese technicians at independence, and the burdens of supporting Robert Mugabe's guerrilla force during the Rhodesian civil war in the late 1970s. The last of these factors had cost Mozambique heavily, both financially and in damage suffered at the hands of the Rhodesian armed forces, but even this had not caused any serious split in the regime's ranks.

Since launching the insurgency five years ago, the NRM has gradually expanded its area of operations and attacked increasingly important targets. Its successes are aggravating endemic weaknesses in Mozambique's economy and restiveness in the armed forces. Machel's position appears secure for the time being, but the array of difficulties and forces that he faces is weakening his grip on power. Even if he survives, his regime could well undergo major changes as the leadership tries to come to grips with the NRM insurgency (see appendix A).

### Political Frictions

The question of how to deal with the insurgency is at the root of the controversy within the ruling party's 10-man Politburo and in the 23-man Council of Ministers.

One group—probably the largest—is composed primarily of black nationalists in high party and government posts who want to avoid further dependence on Moscow. The group is led by Machel, Foreign Minister Chissano, and military commander Mabote, all of whom were prominent leaders of the insurgency against the Portuguese. They argue strenuously that



Mozambican President Machel: weighing his options carefully

Mozambicans should shoulder most of the burden of fighting the guerrillas, and they would like to send home many of the approximately 500 Soviet and 800 to 1,000 Cuban military advisers now in Mozambique, retaining only those necessary to fill technical positions. The group would prefer to look to Mozambique's neighbors—Tanzania and Zimbabwe—instead of Moscow for military training and advice.

As the insurgency grows, the nationalists may find support from a less clearly defined, relatively nonpolitical group of technically trained officials who hold no party positions. These officials—including Planning Minister Machungo and Telecommunications and Civil Aviation Minister Louisa—are primarily concerned about getting the economy moving and are anxious to see an end to NRM operations against economic targets. The group, some of whose members already deal with Pretoria on economic matters,

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**Key Mozambican Officials**

	Title	Race	Tribe	Ideology
Samora Machel	President	Black	Shangana	Nationalist with Marxist leanings
Marcelino dos Santos	FRELIMO Secretary for Economic Policy	Mulatto		Marxist
Joaquim Alberto Chissano	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Black	Shangana	Moderate
Lt. Gen. Alberto Joaquim Chipande	Minister of National Defense	Black	Makonde	Individual attitudes unknown; primarily a Machel loyalist
Maj. Gen. Armando Emilio Guebuza	Vice Minister of National Defense	Black	Makonde	Marxist
Jorge Rebelo	FRELIMO Secretary for Ideological Work	Goan		Hard line, pro-Soviet
Mariano Matsinhe	Minister of Interior	Black	From Tete Province	Pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban
Sebastiao Marcos Mabote	Vice Minister of National Defense	Black	Shangana	Pragmatist
Alberto Jacinto Soares Veloso	Minister of Security	White	Portuguese	Marxist
Mario da Graca Machungo	Minister of Planning	Black	Maputo Province, possibly a Ronga	Moderate
Jose Oscar Monteiro	Minister in the Presidency	Goan		Pro-Soviet, hard line
Graca Simbine Machel	Minister of Education and Culture	Black	From Gaza Province	Nationalist with Marxist leanings
Jose Luis Cabaco	Minister of Information	White	Portuguese	Technocrat with Marxist leanings
Julio Zamith Carrilho	Minister of Public Works and Housing	Mulatto		Technocrat
Rui Baltazar dos Santos Alves	Minister of Finance	White	Portuguese	Technocrat
Salomao Munguambe	Minister of Foreign Trade	Black	From Maputo, probably a Shangana	Moderate technocrat
Teodato Hunguana	Minister of Justice	Black	Ronga	Technocrat
Sergio Vieira	Minister of Agriculture	Goan		Pro-Soviet, hard line
Prakash Ratilal	Minister Governor of the Bank of Mozambique	Goan		Pragmatist
Antonio Lima Branco	Minister for Industry and Energy	White	Portuguese	Technocrat
Pascoal Manuel Mocumbi	Minister of Health	Black	Maputo Province, probably a Shangana	Pragmatist
Luis Maria Alcantara Santos	Minister of Ports and Surface Transport	White	Portuguese	Technocrat
Rui Jorge Lousa	Minister of Ports, Telecommunications and Civil Aviation	White	Portuguese	Technocrat
Manuel Aranda da Silva	Minister of Internal Trade	White	Portuguese	Moderate technocrat

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
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evidently advocates a more frequent, open, and conciliatory dialogue with South Africa. Some of these "technocrats" may even be willing to negotiate directly with the NRM. [REDACTED]

The nationalists—with or without the support of the "technocrats"—face formidable opposition from a small but influential group of radicals, dominated by mulattoes and whites, who wish to strengthen Mozambique's ties with Moscow and its allies. This stridently Marxist group includes such party officials as Secretary for Economic Policy dos Santos and Secretary for Ideological Work Rebelo. They argue that the insurgency is solely the product of an anti-Mozambican "imperialist conspiracy" led by South Africa and the United States. These hardline Marxists also hope to persuade Machel that an increased Communist military role is the only solution to the NRM insurgency. They believe that this, in turn, would lead Mozambique to follow more closely a Marxist-Leninist model in other matters. [REDACTED]

Despite the government's frequent pro-Soviet pronouncements, the black nationalists appear to have the upper hand on most domestic questions. Mozambique's pro-Soviet foreign policy, however, reflects the views of the Marxist group. The government's inability to suppress the insurgency and its general lack of success in obtaining non-Communist military aid probably will work to strengthen the hand of the pro-Soviet faction. [REDACTED]

Machel is aware of growing dissatisfaction with his government, and he fears a military or civilian move against him in the near term. At present, he believes that his most likely replacement would be a fellow black nationalist, Foreign Minister Chissano. Chissano, like Machel, is a popular national figure because of his longstanding service and solid performance in the ruling party—the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). [REDACTED]



Times of Zambia ©

Foreign Minister Chissano: dis-trusted by Machel [REDACTED]



#### A Tired Military

Just as frictions among government and party officials are mounting, so too are frustrations within the military. These will worsen as NRM activities continue (see appendix B). [REDACTED]

The 25,000-man Mozambican military is in disarray. It suffers from poor training and leadership, a lack of working equipment, serious logistic deficiencies, and a confused command structure that Machel shuffles every few months. These shortcomings and the military's inability to defeat the insurgents have contributed to widespread morale problems, illness, and desertions—often to the NRM. [REDACTED]

The effectiveness of the armed forces has been further undercut by:

- A government search for military scapegoats in the wake of South African raids near Maputo in January 1981.
- Continuing problems in transforming FRELIMO's preindependence guerrilla force into a conventional, disciplined army. This effort has included the demobilization of some 20 percent of the Army—

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largely older, illiterate enlisted men who participated in the fight for independence—and the establishment of conventional rankings for military leaders, a move that has created jealousies among the top ranks.

- Machel's obvious dissatisfaction with some military leaders' performance. Last year he publicly humiliated some of them during a speech in Maputo.
- Tribal rivalries. The Army is comprised mostly of northern Mozambicans, but is led largely by Machel's fellow southerners.
- Impressment into the Army of youngsters under 18, the minimum legal age for conscription. [REDACTED]

The military recently has been forced to allocate between one-third and one-half of its troops to the counterinsurgency effort. In addition, nearly every top military officer was assigned to a major but indecisive offensive against the NRM that took place late last year. [REDACTED]

We have seen no direct evidence of anti-Machel sentiment at senior levels of the military, but well-documented discontent at lower levels and Machel's often insensitive treatment of the top ranks suggest that he faces resentment among senior officers as well. Mozambican military personnel at all levels almost certainly resent repeated exhortations from Maputo to carry out counterinsurgency operations before needed equipment or reinforcements have arrived or when weather conditions are unfavorable. [REDACTED]

#### **The NRM Targets the Economy**

In addition to creating divisions in government and military circles, NRM operations against economic installations have heightened discontent among the populace. The insurgents appear increasingly able to capitalize on these sentiments. [REDACTED]

The Mozambican economy was sorely hurt by the mass exodus of most of the 200,000 Portuguese technicians in 1975 and the Machel regime's hurried drive to create a socialist state. Mozambique's decision in 1976 to close its border with the white regime

in Rhodesia further damaged the economy. This move cost Maputo an estimated \$100-150 million annually in lost transport fees (about 75 percent of Rhodesia's imports and exports had passed through Mozambique), and remittances from Rhodesia. The border was reopened when Zimbabwe became independent under majority rule in 1980. [REDACTED]

The Rhodesian civil war put additional economic burdens on Maputo during the latter part of the 1970s as Machel agreed to admit some 100,000 refugees into Mozambique, along with at least 10,000 guerrillas of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). A series of punishing raids by Rhodesian military officers against ZANU facilities as well as Mozambican ports and rail lines further undercut Mozambique's prospects for economic recovery. [REDACTED]

Maputo's hopes that the end of the Rhodesian conflict would allow the country to focus on economic recovery and development have been dashed by the NRM's guerrilla activities. The insurgents have succeeded in disrupting key sectors of the economy—transport, energy, and agriculture. [REDACTED]

Joint South African-NRM operations against key transportation links have included attacks on Beira, Mozambique's second-largest port after Maputo, and on rail and road links between these two major ports that are also Mozambique's largest cities. These raids have disrupted coal exports and other foreign trade activity, domestic commerce, and distribution of food and other vital supplies throughout the countryside. [REDACTED]

South African-NRM teams also launch frequent operations against rail and road links between Mozambique and its inland neighbors—Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. Last October, for instance, the NRM claimed responsibility for the bombing of a bridge over the Pungoe River, disrupting road and rail traffic from Beira to Zimbabwe and delaying the reopening of the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline, which had been scheduled for early 1982. As a result, the governments of these countries have begun to regard

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Mozambique as an unreliable transit partner. Continued interruption of these links will probably lead these countries to decrease their use of Mozambique for transit purposes and increase their dependence on South African facilities. [REDACTED]

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The NRM has repeatedly knocked out power lines to Beira and other cities. Its favorite energy-producing target, however, has been the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric power dam, which—when in operation—earns Maputo some \$75 million annually in badly needed foreign currency by supplying electricity to South Africa. Last year the insurgents sabotaged the dam at least three times, putting it out of operation for most of the year. Pretoria, by comparison, has only been inconvenienced for short periods of time by NRM operations against the dam as it has been able to call on alternative sources of electricity. [REDACTED]

Finally, the NRM has hindered Mozambique's agricultural growth by sabotaging large state-run farm complexes and by interrupting rail and road traffic to them. Frequent NRM harassment of government vehicles on major highways has also prevented the distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural supplies. [REDACTED]

The guerrillas, who have long attacked Communist advisers in Mozambique, recently have targeted non-Communist advisers as well. They kidnaped an Englishman and a Chilean working on aid projects, ambushed vehicles owned by Swedish aid teams, and killed two Portuguese technicians who were working on the Cahora Bassa Dam. [REDACTED]

Such attacks are part of the NRM's efforts to disrupt economic activity but also are designed to obstruct Machel's efforts to expand Mozambican ties with Western Europe. Guerrilla attacks on Westerners have led Sweden and other donors to revamp their aid programs in Mozambique so that aid technicians operate away from NRM-frequented areas. [REDACTED]

#### South Africa's Intentions

Machel's political future may well hinge on the intentions of South Africa, which has major economic

leverage<sup>1</sup> it can use against Mozambique in addition to the military support it gives the NRM. Bilateral relations have become increasingly tense in recent years and Pretoria could at any time attempt to use these levers to replace Machel with the NRM. [REDACTED]

South Africa began supporting the NRM in early 1980 as Zimbabwe approached independence. The insurgents, no longer able to look to a white Rhodesian regime for support, moved most of their men from bases in Zimbabwe to facilities in South Africa's Transvaal region and the Venda homeland. Some remained inside Mozambique, where they continued to launch intermittent attacks on minor economic targets and occasionally ambushed small Mozambican military units. Initially, Pretoria extended only modest aid to the insurgents, primarily through air-drops of supplies and weapons inside Mozambique. [REDACTED]

Pretoria's original purpose in supporting the insurgents was to put pressure on Machel to rein in the African National Congress (ANC), the leading South African black nationalist group. The ANC had launched several raids from Mozambique into South Africa, including a dramatic attack on South Africa's prized synthetic fuel plants. The South Africans' concern about the ANC also had risen because they feared it might gain the backing of newly elected Zimbabwean President Mugabe, a close ally of Machel. [REDACTED]

Efforts by Machel in early 1980 to control the ANC proved largely unsuccessful, and South Africa continued to support the NRM. Pretoria by that time had realized that the guerrillas—with increased support—could serve other purposes. [REDACTED]

<sup>1</sup> After Mozambique became independent, South Africa replaced Portugal as the Mozambicans' largest trading partner. Mozambique depends on the South Africans for the bulk of its foreign exchange earnings: it exports electricity to South Africa from the Cahora Bassa Dam, obtains port and storage fees for South African exports passing through its ports, and receives remittances from the approximately 55,000 Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] South Africa now employs the NRM mainly as a means of preventing the black states in the region from easing their economic dependence on Pretoria. By attacking Mozambican transportation links, the NRM has prevented Maputo from assuming South Africa's role as the primary transit route for Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Zaire.<sup>2</sup> [redacted]

Nonetheless, the high levels of South African assistance to the insurgents—which far exceed that necessary to counter Machel's support for the ANC or to maintain South Africa's economic hegemony in the region—suggest also that Pretoria is considering giving enough aid to the NRM to enable it to become a direct challenge to the Machel regime. A growing number of military officers apparently regard the current Mozambican regime as an intolerable security threat to South Africa because it continues to harbor ANC guerrillas and because of its links with the USSR and its allies. Some of these officers argue that such security concerns outweigh all other foreign policy considerations. [redacted]

Just how much authority these officers have is difficult to gauge. [redacted]

At odds with the military are a number of civilian officials in Pretoria who argue that expanding South African aid to the NRM would only aggravate Pretoria's international isolation. In an effort to counter the military's enthusiasm for the NRM, these officials unrealistically demand that the NRM establish a government-in-exile and work toward gaining at least some African recognition. They have also encouraged

<sup>2</sup> South African officials were displeased when nine black southern African states formed the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC) in mid-1980 with the clearly stated intention of working together to reduce Pretoria's economic leverage in the region. South Africa was further troubled when Western developed nations subsequently pledged some \$650 million in support of economic projects planned by the SADCC. [redacted]

the insurgents to develop links with conservative politicians in Western Europe and security officials in Morocco. [redacted]

On balance, South Africa probably does not intend to try to replace Machel with the NRM in the near future. Many officials in Pretoria recognize that, at present, substantial and continuing infusions of South African aid would be needed to keep an NRM government in power, given the guerrilla group's lack of wide domestic support and of any outside recognition. At the same time, other South African officials probably sense that the NRM wants greater autonomy from Pretoria and that it might attempt to abandon pro-South African policies after coming to power. [redacted]

#### Prospects for Machel

Despite this reluctance to commit itself to Machel's ouster, Pretoria apparently is planning to increase further its support for the insurgents. For the most part, the South Africans are pleased with the guerrillas' performance and believe that the benefits to South Africa far outweigh the costs Pretoria has incurred. The South Africans may hope, moreover, that increased assistance will cement their ties with the insurgents as well as help the NRM build a wider political base. Greater support for the NRM is also part of South Africa's generally more aggressive foreign policy in the region as a result of increasing ANC activities and the advent of black rule in Zimbabwe. [redacted]

Continued NRM attacks are likely to increase the hardline Marxist ministers' political leverage within the Mozambican Government. They are already trying to convince Machel that increased Soviet and/or Cuban military involvement offers Mozambique its best hope for dealing a decisive blow to the insurgents. [redacted]

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Machel (r) with FRELIMO Secretary for Economic Planning dos Santos ... the power behind the throne? [redacted]

Machel, who realizes he has little chance of finding an effective military patron outside the Communist world, is likely eventually to acquiesce in the demands of the pro-Soviet hardliners. [redacted]

Machel may conclude that the West cares little about Mozambique—particularly if NRM attacks on non-Communist advisers lead to a reduction or termination of Western development aid. [redacted]

Machel probably will take his time before calling for any marked increase in aid from the Soviets or their allies. Despite his Marxist rhetoric, he is a reflective, nationalistic leader who does not want his country to fall totally under Soviet dominance. [redacted]

Such hesitation, however, could prompt leftist plotting, particularly by hardline officials close to the Soviets, such as Secretary for Economic Policy dos Santos. He or another hardliner might be able to obtain Soviet backing for a move against the President, given the longstanding frictions between Machel and the Soviets over such issues as the terms and amount of Soviet economic aid and the quantity and quality of Soviet military aid. [redacted]

A dearth of information on the military makes it difficult to predict its response to a coup attempt. Top officers loyal to Machel might be unable to aid him immediately if—as often is the case—they are involved in counterinsurgency operations far from Maputo. Other officers closer to the capital might view a leadership change with relief if Machel continues to make unrealistic demands on them to defeat the NRM. [redacted]

#### Implications for the United States

To stay in power, the Mozambican regime probably will soon be compelled to increase its military dependence on the Soviets and their allies. Machel's inability to defeat the NRM coupled with related economic and military problems will enhance Moscow's position there. Specifically:

- The pro-Soviet hardliners in the Machel government are likely to gain decisive influence.
- They, in turn, may persuade Machel to call for a substantial increase in Soviet and/or Cuban military aid.
- If Machel hesitates to call for greater Communist military aid, the hardline pro-Soviet group might organize a coup attempt. [redacted]

Western interests could be damaged in a variety of ways. In the near term, Mozambique would be likely to cut back its recently established economic links with Western Europe. Talks in recent months between high-level Mozambican officials and their Portuguese, Italian, and French counterparts have indicated that prospects are promising for expansion of these relationships, which contrast markedly with Moscow's meager aid to Maputo. [redacted]

If it comes under greater Soviet influence, Mozambique might also become less cooperative in negotiations on Namibia. So far, Machel generally has refrained from playing an obstructive role. Increased Soviet leverage might lead to some success in Moscow's efforts to persuade Machel not to cooperate with the Western contact group. [redacted]

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Faced with a more pro-Soviet government in Maputo, South Africa would quickly become more intransigent toward all of its neighbors. Pretoria, like Maputo, also would become less cooperative with the Western Five's initiatives on Namibia and might even decide to pull out of the talks if Machel brings in a sizable number of Cuban troops. [REDACTED]

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Over the longer term, Mozambique would be likely to ease its restrictions on ANC activities in the country, and Moscow probably would step up its support to the ANC there. As a result, the ANC would probably increase its operations against South Africa. [REDACTED]

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In addition, the West's regional role would suffer as Communist powers gained leverage over nonaligned or pro-Western inland countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, which use Mozambique's transportation network. Some of these countries might seek to make greater use of South African railways, but Pretoria would probably be unable to handle a large increase in such traffic. [REDACTED]

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Finally, the Soviets and their allies might acquire access rights to naval or air facilities in Mozambique. At present, only Soviet naval craft make occasional port calls. Regularized Soviet access to airfields in Mozambique could result in expanded maritime reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean, including surveillance of the approaches to the key US installation of Diego Garcia. [REDACTED]

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## Appendix A

### The National Resistance Movement (NRM) [REDACTED]

#### History

Several small anti-Machel groups merged in early 1977 to form the National Resistance Movement. Included in these groups were conservative Mozambican whites who had fled when Machel took power, blacks from several small political parties that had refused to meld with FRELIMO, and some FRELIMO officials who had become disenchanted with Machel soon after independence in July 1975. The dissidents agreed to establish the NRM at a meeting in Rhodesia called by Orlando Cristina, a white Mozambican, who convinced the various factions that unity would improve their prospects for overthrowing Machel. [REDACTED]

The NRM, less than 100 strong at first, soon began receiving support from the Rhodesian military. NRM guerrillas in return served as guides inside Mozambique for Rhodesian troops operating against Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union. By the end of 1977 the NRM had begun launching small-scale hit-and-run attacks of its own on economic targets in central Mozambique. [REDACTED]

#### Leadership

The top leaders of the NRM are the founder, Orlando Cristina [REDACTED] in his fifties, and Alfonso Jacamo, a 28-year-old black former FRELIMO official. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another black former FRELIMO fighter, Jose Domingos, is also a key military leader. [REDACTED]

The NRM's spokesman is Eve Fernandes, a white who has long been associated with a number of anti-Machel groups. He lives in Lisbon, where the NRM has its sole office in Western Europe. [REDACTED]



*NRM military commander Jacamo ... too independent minded for Pretoria's liking?* [REDACTED]

#### Ideology

NRM leaders generally espouse anti-Communist, pro-free-market and pro-Western views. The insurgents have stated that one of their major goals is to rid Mozambique of its Communist advisers, some of whom they have killed. The NRM argues that only Moscow and Havana maintain Machel in power. [REDACTED]

#### Size and Source of Recruits

NRM membership has grown steadily since 1977 and now numbers between 8,000 and 10,000. During the first few years of the active insurgency, most NRM recruits were disenchanted Mozambican troops or political detainees whom the insurgents had freed from government "reeducation camps." The Mozambican military and border guards are still a valuable source of recruits; at one time in 1980 an entire government company reportedly defected to the NRM. The NRM has also been augmenting its ranks by forced recruiting throughout Manica and Sofala Provinces in central Mozambique. Recruits pressed into service are less dependable than volunteers and frequently desert or defect to the government side. [REDACTED]

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**Local Support**

The insurgents have some popular support, but it is limited largely to Manica and Sofala Provinces, where the NRM is most active.<sup>3</sup> The Machel regime's growing unpopularity, the NRM's ability to provide commodities from South Africa that are unavailable locally, and its joint cultivation of crops with local villagers have all worked in the guerrillas' favor. Tribal factors have also contributed to the group's popularity in the two central Mozambican provinces. For example, military commander Jacamo is affiliated with the powerful Ndau ethnic group of central Mozambique, while the NRM has restored—in areas under its control—tribal customs that Machel outlawed shortly after independence. [REDACTED]

**Area of Operations and Tacts**

The NRM operates largely between the Save and Zambezi Rivers in central Mozambique, although it conducts at least sporadic raids in nearly every province. The insurgents use a variety of small arms and mortars and sometimes are accompanied by South African military officers. The guerrillas are organized in battalion-size units but generally operate in small bands from well-hidden bases located in the Gorongosa Mountain range. [REDACTED]

The guerrillas harass Mozambican military units up to brigade size and have assassinated several Mozambican officials. Recently, the NRM has conducted sporadic conventional attacks on Mozambican troops, but with only limited success. [REDACTED]

**Political Wing**

Shortly after Pretoria began aiding the guerrillas in 1980, they formed a political wing, but to little effect. [REDACTED]

<sup>3</sup> These two provinces contain only about 7 percent of Mozambique's 12 million people. [REDACTED]

NRM factionalism that has sharpened in recent months is also hindering the effectiveness of the political wing. [REDACTED]

**External South African Support**

South African military support is vital to the NRM's ability to conduct an insurgency. The South African armed forces provide:

- Training for NRM troops, both in the Transvaal and inside Mozambique.
- A small number of advisers inside Mozambique to help direct military activities.
- Air and sea drops of supplies and weapons.
- A small transmitter for the NRM's radiobroadcasting station, the Voice of Free Africa, located in South Africa's Natal Province.
- Field communications equipment.
- Funding for the activities of the NRM's political wing, especially its efforts to win support for the NRM outside South Africa. [REDACTED]

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## Appendix B

### The Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM)

#### History

The Mozambican armed forces evolved from the 15,000-strong, loosely organized FRELIMO guerrilla force. Some 5,000 troops initially were selected for a guerrilla-style army, with the rest slated to form air force, navy, and border guard units. Many of these men, however, reentered civilian life instead or joined the security police. The military retained its guerrilla name, the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM), for five years after independence. In September 1980, President Machel created a more conventional military structure, with formal ranks, and named it the Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM). The President serves as Commander in Chief. [REDACTED]

#### Organization

Under the reorganization, the military has been broken down into a 25,000-man Army, a 1,000-man Air Force, an 800-man Navy, and a 3,500-man Border Guard.<sup>4</sup> The *Army* is organized regionally, in the southern, central, and northern commands (see map).<sup>5</sup> The Southern Command, whose area includes Maputo, has the largest permanent troop strength; the Central Command frequently is augmented from the other commands for anti-NRM operations. [REDACTED]

<sup>4</sup> These are estimated personnel strengths. [REDACTED]

<sup>5</sup> The Southern Command, with headquarters in Maputo, is responsible for the area south of the Save River. It consists of four motorized infantry brigades—the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 8th. The major combat units within the Command are two mechanized infantry battalions, two motorized infantry battalions, two tank battalions, and various support units. [REDACTED] The Central Command, with headquarters in Beira, is responsible for the region between the Save and Zambezi Rivers, the primary area of NRM operations. The Command consists of three motorized infantry brigades—the 3rd, 4th, and 5th—and includes two mechanized infantry battalions, two tank battalions, and various support units. The large number of motorized units in this Command reflects the region's mountainous terrain. [REDACTED] The Northern Command, with headquarters probably at Cuamba, is responsible for the sparsely populated area north of the Zambezi River. It consists of only one motorized infantry brigade with no major combat units. [REDACTED]

The *Air Force* is small, consisting of two squadrons of Soviet-supplied aircraft that generally are stationed at Beira and sometimes at Maputo. The squadrons have a total of 23 MIG-17s and three MIG-15s. Other aircraft include six AN-25 transporters and four MI-8 helicopters. Continued shortages of trained pilots probably will keep the Air Force small for some time to come. [REDACTED]

The *Navy* operates on Lake Malawi and on the Indian Ocean, using the ports of Metangula (on Lake Malawi), Maputo, Beira, Nacala, and Pemba. The Navy's equipment includes nine patrol boats and four landing craft, all left behind by the Portuguese in 1975 and frequently in need of repairs. [REDACTED]

The *Border Guard* which is distinct from the military but works closely with it, consists of four brigades with headquarters at Chimoio, Massingir, Moatize, and Lichinga. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They also have fought the NRM, often in coordination with the Army. During major offensives against NRM camps, the Border Guards have helped seal the Mozambican border in an effort to trap fleeing guerrillas. [REDACTED]

#### Recruiting and Training

A military induction system established in 1978 requires all Mozambican males 18 years old or older to serve at least two years. Women are exempted but may volunteer. The military usually calls up recruits twice a year. Despite the draft, there are persistent personnel shortages because of desertions caused by poor morale. Training takes place at several centers throughout the country (see map). [REDACTED]

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This map illustrates the command boundaries and ground forces training areas in Mozambique and its neighboring regions. The map includes the following details:

- Geographical Features:**
  - Neighboring Countries:** Tanzania to the north, Zambia to the northwest, Malawi to the west, Zimbabwe to the southwest, South Africa to the south, and Swaziland to the south-southwest.
  - Water Bodies:** Lake Nyasa, Lake Cahora Bassa, and the Zambezia River.
  - Coastal Features:** Cabo Delgado, Vila de Montepuez, Nampula, and Nacala.
- Command Boundaries:**
  - Niassa:** Includes Lichinga and Cuamba.
  - Manica:** Includes Vila Machado, Vila do Dondo, Beira, and Sofala.
  - Inhambane:** Includes Inhambane.
  - Gaza:** Includes Sao Jorge do Limpopo, Massingir, Mabalane, Vila do Chibuto, and Maputo.
  - Maputo:** Includes Boane and Catembe.
- Ground Forces and Training Areas:**
  - Yate:** Includes Cahora Bassa Dam.
  - Tete:** Includes Moatize.
  - SALISBURY:** Located in the southwest.
- Legend:**
  - Command boundary (dashed line)
  - Ground forces and training area (circle)
- Scale:** 0 to 200 Kilometers.

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**Leadership**

President Machel, who is the Commander in Chief, assumed the rank of field marshal in September 1980. Other key military personnel include:

- Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Alberto Chipande.
- Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Sebastiao Mabote.
- Chief of Intelligence/Counterintelligence Col. Lagos Lidimo.
- Army Commander Maj. Gen. Joaquim Munhepe.
- Deputy Army Commander Maj. Gen. Tobias Dai.
- Navy Commander Maj. Manuel Caetano.
- Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Joao Mpfumo.
- Border Guard Commander Maj. Gen. Tome Eduardo.
- Political Commissar of the Mozambican Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Armando Guebuza. [REDACTED]

**External Support**

Despite recent efforts by the Machel regime to diversify its sources of military aid, the military is highly dependent on the Soviets and their allies for equipment and advisory assistance. Some 500 Soviet and 800 to 1,000 Cuban military personnel are now in Mozambique. The Soviets serve as advisers to all high-level Mozambican officers. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Soviets also provide maintenance technicians for MIG aircraft and may be helping the Border Guard in organizing border checkpoints. [REDACTED]

Mozambican officers attend a variety of training courses in the USSR and Cuba. [REDACTED]

Machel recently has tried to obtain military support—including equipment and training—from Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. He has been largely successful. Among the main roadblocks have been Mozambique's inability to pay and Moscow's opposition to any non-Communist military aid to Mozambique. [REDACTED]

**Arsenal**

Most items in the Mozambican arsenal have been supplied by Moscow or its allies. Key equipment includes:

- |     |                                   |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
| 220 | medium tanks                      |
| 183 | armored personnel carriers        |
| 109 | scout cars                        |
| 239 | field artillery pieces            |
| 511 | mortars                           |
| 204 | multiple rocket launchers         |
| 255 | antiaircraft guns                 |
| 12  | SA-3 missile launchers            |
| 32  | SA-7 missile launchers [REDACTED] |

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